

The toolkit is broad. The pathway is distributed.

For many national-security objectives, the first task is assembling an existing-authority pathway—not inventing a new power.

168

capability records

14

authority-type families

29

enterprise / I&S actor nodes

Working judgment: DoD has tools to research, buy, finance, build, partner and protect. Different offices control the requirement, money, approval and delivery.

These are inventory counts—not 168 independent powers or certified, immediately executable options.

What the toolkit can do—with conditions


Fourteen inventory families, condensed into six action themes.

01 Discover Research, prototype, experiment, award grants and prizes.	02 Buy & transition Contract, license technology and use qualifying follow-on production.	03 Finance & expand Eligible loans, guarantees, specified investments and capacity incentives.
04 Build & sustain Acquire or lease property, construct facilities and partner with depots.	05 Partner Co-develop, exchange logistics, receive contributions and provide eligible assistance.	06 Protect Industrial security and narrowly scoped intelligence / CI financial mechanisms.

“DoD cannot invest” is too broad. Credit, housing equity and intermediary investment are different, specifically bounded mechanisms.

Who assembles the package?

Illustrative routing—not a delegation chart. The mission sponsor rarely controls every step.




I&S depth
I&S integrates; DCSA, DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO and Service CI elements have different missions and execution roles.

Partner-owned decisions
State, Treasury, Commerce, DOJ or law enforcement may own an indispensable part of the pathway.

SOCOM is distinct: its statutory acquisition responsibilities should not be assumed to apply identically to every combatant command.

Five conditions connect power to action

A missing condition may be a funding, approval or implementation problem—not a missing law.



ILLUSTRATIVE CASE · CRITICAL-MATERIAL SHORTFALL

Defense demand → **capacity / credit / stockpile mechanism** → eligible funds → authorized award official → qualified defense buyer

Coordination is not a substitute for substantive authority. Choose the authorized act before selecting a transfer or reimbursement vehicle.

Fiscal / coordination anchors: 31 U.S.C. [§1301](#), [§1341](#), [§1502](#), [§1535](#); 10 U.S.C. [§149](#), [§4817](#).
The example is an analytical coordination pattern, not an approved transaction or verified funding package.

Do not put every obstacle in the “gap” bucket

A · SUPPORTED LEGAL BOUNDARIES

Unavailable without a lawful basis or exception

- Spend beyond the applicable fiscal authority.
- Move appropriations merely by coordination.
- Treat an other transaction as exemption from all law.
- Infer general civilian enforcement powers from the defense mission.


Each boundary has a defined scope; statute-specific exceptions still matter.

B · DESIRED OUTCOMES / POSSIBLE GAPS

Identify the residual legal act—not just the unmet objective

- Faster production: existing mechanisms identified; execution conditions remain.
- Any-dollar, any-purpose flexibility: a fiscal-authority limit.
- Blanket control of firms’ financial behavior: candidate scope question, not a settled finding.

Test existing DoD tools and lawful partner routes before concluding that new law is needed.



A: 31 U.S.C. §1341, §1532; 10 U.S.C. §4022, §275. B: 2026 National Defense Strategy; EO 14372. Strategy and EO documents identify demand here; they are not treated as independent grants of statutory power.

Build a package around the requirement

The tools already reach beyond buying.

Specified investment, credit, property and industrial-capacity mechanisms challenge a procurement-only view of DoD.

Partner dependence can be a pathway.

10 U.S.C. §385 supports certain complementary foreign-assistance work DoD cannot perform itself. It is a narrow bridge—not a transfer of another agency’s powers.

Resources and implementation can be the real gap.

GAO documented DCSA workforce, risk-analysis and IT gaps. Those findings do not by themselves demonstrate missing statutory authority.

One requirement. One accountable integrator. One documented package.

Identify the lawful act, resource owner, approving official, executor and partner dependencies—then isolate any remaining need for new authority.

Still unresolved at transaction level: precise instrument scope, actual funds, implementation and delegations.
Public sources do not establish internal willingness, every available balance, or every classified authority.