Exclude risky sources or subcontractors from covered national-security-system procurements
- Objective
- Protect technology and industry
- Family / instrument
- Intelligence, counterintelligence and security · Supply-chain security
- Statute
- Authority holder
- Secretary of Defense or Secretary of a military department
- Executor · routing lead
- Authorized component contracting, agreements, or personnel office; assignment is illustrative
Recorded eligibility gates (excerpt)
Limit action to covered procurements, covered systems, and covered IT supply as defined in §3252(d).
Consult relevant officials, make a written national-security necessity finding and a finding that less intrusive measures are not reasonably available, and notify the specified congressional committees.All requirements & limits
Recorded funding condition (excerpt)
Existing acquisition resources; no separate capital or grant authority.All funding conditions
What this does not authorize / limits
This is not a government-wide ban on any disfavored supplier; action must fit the statute’s three covered procurement actions.
- The specialized bid-protest limitation applies as stated in §3252(c), not to every supply-chain decision.
Implementation caution: Statutory-source review only. A current implementing program, open intake, available funds and individual delegation were not verified.
Public evidence describes the institution and instrument; it is not approval of an individual transaction. Express statutory pathway identified in the USC scrub. Current implementation, public intake, appropriations, available balances, and transaction-specific delegations were not independently verified.
Actor sources
Independent public-source guide; not an official U.S. government website. Record reviewed 2026-10-05. Read the full record for currentness, coordination and all source notes.