B-09 / Strategic assessment
Protect critical firms and technology against hostile economic influence
Partner-dependent pathway
Existing pathway
DoD industrial-security/CI work, procurement exclusions and risk assessment can inform a broader response; investment screening and civilian investigation involve other authorities and actors.
What remains unresolved
DoD cannot infer an unrestricted civilian search, prosecution, asset-blocking or company-acquisition prohibition power from its security mission. Specific DoD investigative powers remain distinct. Separately, GAO documented industrial-security workforce, regional risk-analysis and IT implementation gaps; those are execution/resource-management findings, not proof of missing statutory powers.
Coordination or legislative question
Route the needed act to the competent interagency authority; only seek new DoD power if a defined residual requirement cannot be met through that lawful division of responsibilities.
Analytical mapping from the cited demand to statutory mechanisms; not a claim that the strategy expressly requests every possible mechanism.
Sources
- 2026 National Defense Strategy, pp. 5, 16–21
- EO 14415, Securing America’s Defense Supply Chains (July 20, 2026)
- 10 U.S.C. § 137 (Source under maintenance) · 2024 edition (GovInfo)
- 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (Source under maintenance) · 2024 edition (GovInfo)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Source under maintenance) · 2024 edition (GovInfo)
- GAO-26-107861, Industrial Security (April 24, 2026; recommendation updates August 2026)